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Condemnation of Part of the Duration of an
Interest-Just Compensation
The Federal Government possesses the power of eminent do-
main, but its exercise is sharply limited by the Fifth Amendment:
"... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." The meaning to be given to the term "prop-
erty" bears directly upon the determination of the elements to be
considered in fixing just compensation. At times the word is used
to indicate a tangible object. In the case of real property, if it is
held to be the equivalent of the tangible, land, compensation need
be made only when that is taken, and need be equal only to its value.
Since it is only in a possessory sense that land can be said to
be "taken" by the power of eminent domain, and since a lease gives
the right to possession, a leasehold falls within the definition of
property. A lessee is entitled to share in the award when all or
a part of the property leased is taken by eminent domain during
the term of the lease.' In such cases the fair market value of the
property is to be ascertained as in a single ownership, after which
the amount awarded may be divided among the interested parties
according to the value of their interests.2 The condemnor cannot
by settling with the owner deprive the lessee of his right to have
the value of his leasehold judicially ascertained.' Of course, the
lease itself may contain a provision which controls the rights of the
parties in the event of the condemnation of the leased premises.4
Following the rule of compensation for market value, used when
the interest taken is the fee,5 the federal courts have held that
compensation to the lessee is to be measured by the market value
of the lease, its fair rental value.0
The hardship thus placed on the tenant has not escaped notice.
Market value has been called an unsatisfactory test of the value of
a leasehold interest, for it seldom has any market value.7 In
'Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924); Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
'Carlock v. United States, 53 F. 2d 926 (App. D.C. 1931).
'Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924)
"United States v. 8286 Square Feet of Space, 61 F Supp. 737 (D. Md.
1945) ; United States v. 10,620 Square Feet, 62 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
Bt cf. United States v. 150.29 Acres of Land, 152 F 2d 33 (C.C.A. 7th 1945).
' Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1933) ; United States v. Chand-
ler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1912), ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN 56 (1936).
'Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States, 284 Fed. 849 (C.C.A. 5th 1922).
'Metropolitan West Side Elevated Ry. v. Siegel, 161 Ill. 638, 44 N.E. 276
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another sense-more properly-property denotes not only a tan-
gible thing, but an aggregation of interests of which a thing is the
subject matter. In this conception, the lessee should be additionally
compensated for interferences with the legal relations that con-
stitute his property. Some state courts have rejected the standard
of market value and allowed the tenant to recover for his removal
costsA8 The right of which the tenant is deprived and for which
he should be compensated is the right to remain in undisturbed
possession to the end of the term. The value of that right cannot
be measured by the rental value of the lease. Only by allowing
him the expense of securing a new place for his business is he
justly compensated.
Refusal to consider such "consequential damages" in determin-
ing compensation produced harsh results, but the federal courts
consistently denied their recovery by the lessee., Consequential
damages were not allowed in one case on the theory that the lessee
had constructive notice that he might be deprived of the use of his
premises by eminent domain.'0 Other theories have been advanced
for their denial." One is that since the lessee would have to bear
these removal costs at the expiration of his term, the condemnation
merely changes the date at which they are incurred. Another is
that removal costs are arbitrary and speculative; that the lessee
might move to a distant point prompted by whim or caprice.
These theories seem to ignore the idea that compensation should
be equal to the condemnee's loss. The lessee who has installed
equipment intends that it will be used there for at least the full
term of the lease. Interference with this use before the end of the
term forms the basis for his right to compensation for its removal.
The condemnee is extremely unlikely to move his equipment a
great distance in order to increase the amount of the award in an
attempt to "get even" with the government for condemning his
property. His sole interest is in getting his business in operation
again-quickly, at a good location. The issue to be resolved is
whether the owner or the government (public) is to bear this cost.
A major step towards giving actual effect to the principle of
(1896); Des Moines Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. 486
(1924), McMillan Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. & W Ry., 2,16 Pa. 504, 65
At. 1091 (1907), 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 727, 728 (3d ed. 1909)
8 Cases cited supr'a, note 7.
'United States v. 561 Brannan St., 55 F Supp. 667 (N.D. Cal. 1944);
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 54 F Supp. 561 (S.D. Cal. 1944);
United States v. Entire Fifth Floor, 54 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. N.Y. 1944); United
States v. Improved Premises, 54 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. N.Y. 1944); Win. Wrigley,
Jr. Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 569 (1932), Howard Co. v. United States, 81
Ct. Cl. 646 (1935).
10 Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States, 284 Fed. 849, 850 (C.C.A. 5th 1922).
' See discussion in ORGnL, op. cit. supra, note 5, §§ 67, 68.
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measuring the compensation by the amount of the condemnee's loss
seems to have been taken by the Supreme Court in United States v.
General Motors Corporation.12 The Government instituted proceed-
ings under the authority of the Second War Powers Act13 to acquire
a one year lease of a warehouse on which the defendant had a
twenty year lease. Six years of the term were remaining. The
trial court accepted the Government's theory that the compensation
should be limited to the fair market rental value of the floor space
condemned. Realizing that the rule worked an injustice and seeing
an opportunity to distinguish the case because of its unusual facts,
the circuit court reversed the decision.' It held that the defendant
was entitled to prove, as an element of just compensation, the actual
and necessary expense directly incurred in vacating the property
condemned. The Supreme Court, while affirming, held that the
removal costs should be considered as elements affecting the market
value of the temporary occupancy, not as independent items of
damages.' The Court reiterated the rule which forbids consid-
eration of consequential losses when the fee or the lessee's entire
interest is taken.'"
This holding marked a departure from other eminent domain
cases. One writer has criticized it as an invasion of the legislative
prerogative.17 He points out that Congress, in debating the pro-
posed Second War Powers Act, rejected amendments which would
have awarded consequential damages."
The Court stated that the hardship to the condemnee is greater
where only a part of his interest is taken. This is true, but it seems
to be no basis for the disparity in results. Where the entire interest
is taken, the Court is weighed down by a mass of precedents, since
the temporary taking from a lessee was a case of first impression,
it was free to set forth a more equitable rule.
The war effort greatly increased the Government's need for
property. Temporary interests were acquired in most of the con-
- 323 U.S. 373 (1945), noted in 13 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 242 (1945) ; 39 ILL.
L. REv. 420 (1945), 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 64 (1945); 23 TEx. L. REV. 402
(1945)
'56 STAT. 177 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 632 (Supp. 1945) This power was
terminated Dec. 28, 1945. 59 STAT. 658 (1945), 50 U.S.C. App. § 632a (1946).
" "We agree with the lower court's characterization of the Government's
theory as 'hard law'. We go further and express the view that it should not be
accepted in the absence of definite and controlling authority." General Motors
Corp. v. United States, 140 F 2d 873, 874 (C.C.A. 7th 1944); Comment, 22
N.C.L. RE,. 325 (1944), Noted in 92 PA. L. REv. 453 (1944).
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383 (1945).
"Id. at 379, 380.
Dolan, "Just Compensation" and the General Motors Case, 31 VA. L. REv.
539, 542 (1945).
" 88 CONG. REC. 1649-54 (1942).
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demnation proceedings. The space condemned was largely occupied
by tenants. Occupants, forced to move promptly to other premises,
asserted claims for the cost or damage occasioned by their moving.
Heretofore these claims had been classified as consequential losses
which the condemnee was to bear, but the General Motors decision
gave them new hope and provided an impetus for their assertion.
As noted earlier, 19 many leases contain condemnation clauses.
Tenants contended that such clauses did not apply when the Gov-
ernment did not take the fee, or that at least they were entitled to
receive the cost of removing their equipment and getting established
in new premises. The courts held that the tenants had contracted
away any rights that they might otherwise have had and could not
share in the award.20
In United States v. Katz Drug Company21 the Government ac-
quired a warehouse for a term which would expire fifteen months
sooner than the company's lease. The company was forced to re-
move a large stock of merchandise very quickly, at extra cost. Also,
it had to pay a bonus to lease another warehouse. It sought to have
this bonus cost and the above-normal cost of moving considered in
determining the amount of its award. The trial court refused to
consider these costs, but allowed the company to recover for the
remaining fifteen months of its term. It considered the practical
effect of the taking was to destroy the entire term, for the cost of
moving back after the Government left would be prohibitive and
such a short term would have no market value.
The circuit court of appeals held unjustified the finding that the
taking destroyed the unseized term of the lease. Although the
company would not re-occupy the premises, the lease would still
have a value to the company. However, the bonus cost and the
above-normal moving cost should be considered in determining the
market value of the temporary use taken. It would seem that under
the General Motors ruling the company could have recovered the
total cost of moving, but since it claimed only the above-normal
cost, its recovery was restricted to that.
In United States v. Petty Motor Co. the circuit court of appeals
felt that the principle of the General Motors case was not narrowly
confined to the facts of that case, but controlled whenever the in-
terest taken was less than a fee.22 The Government had taken a
leasehold interest until June 30, 1945, with the right to surrender
possession on June 3, 1943 or 1944. The Petty Motor Company
" Cases cited supra, note 4.
' United States v. 21,815 Square Feet, 155 F. 2d 899 (C.C.A. 2d 1946);
United States v. 10,620 Square Feet, 62 F Supp. 115 (S.D. N.Y. 1945) ; United
States v. 45,000 Square Feet, 62 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1945).
150 F 2d 681 (C.C.A. 8th 1945)
147 F 2d 912 (C.C.A. 10th 1945).
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had a lease which expired October 31, 1943, with the right to renew
for another year. The district court had considered the tenant's
expense incurred in moving and re-installing its equipment, and
the increased rents it was required to pay for other premises in
determining the value of its right of occupancy. The judgment
was affirmed.
This holding was reversed by the Supreme Court..2 3 Since the
shortening of the term was wholly at the Government's election,
the longest limit would determine the extent of the taking. Thus
the company's term would expire before the term taken by the
Government. The court would not permit consideration of removal
and relocation costs. The tenant's award should be the value of the
use and occupancy of the leasehold for the remainder of the tenant's
term less the agreed rent which the tenant would pay for such use
and occupancy.L4 The General Motors case was distinguished on
the ground that in the instant case the entire interest of the lessee
was taken. In the former case the lessee had to return to the lease-
hold at the end of the Government's use or at least assume responsi-
bility for that remainder. Actually in the General Motors case the
Government's taking included a right of yearly renewal. By the
exercise of its right of renewal the Government could have taken
all of General Motor's term. But the Supreme Court looked upon
the Government's tenure as one shorter in duration than that of
the lessee.2*
In the Petty case Mr. Justice Rutledge felt that the company's
interest was only taken contingently 26 He concurred in the result
of the Petty case because the record did not show that the Govern-
ment had exercised its option, but he stated:
That ruling [U. S. v. General Motors] cannot be avoided
by inverting the length of the term specified and, correla-
tively, the character of the option added. 27
The General Motors case has been held inapplicable to another
situation. '- The Government acquired the right to temporary use
and occupancy of the defendant's laundry. Defendant claimed that
the Government had in effect taken its business as well as its
327 U.S. 372 (1946).
Id. at 381.
In a footnote to the General Motors case, 323 U.S. 373, 376, n. 4 (1945),
the Court pointed out that the yearly right of renewal acquired by the Govern-
ment was taken not to alter the question presented in the case.
327 U.S. 372, 381 (1946) (concurring opinion)
- Id. at 385.
' Kimball Laundr, Co. v. United States, 166 F 2d 856 (C.C.A. 8th 1948),
cert. granted, 69 Sup. Ct. 30 (1948). What change, if any, this portends is, of
course, conjectural. It should be noted that the General Motors case reflects the
opinions of but four of the Justices. Three did not participate and two dis-
s nted on the question of removal costs.
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physical assets. It wanted the value of its trade routes and cus-
tomers considered in determining its award. The court held that
compensation was to be measured by the market rental or use value
of the laundry during the Government's occupancy, plus the cost
of restoring the plant and machinery to their condition at the time
of the original taking.29 The General Motors case had expressly
stated that removal costs were to be distinguished from the value
of good will or of injury to the business which must be excluded in
determining market value, 0 so it was not controlling.
Thus the General Motors decision has been confined. It did not
open the flood gates and permit the Government to be swamped by
claims for consequential damages. Condemnees have not received
swollen. verdicts.3 1 The principle evolved is just; a sound result is
reached. Consideration of consequential damages must be granted
if the owner is to be adequately compensated, but some damages
may not be presently capable of accurate measurement.
The condition the property will be in when the Government
terminates its use is uncertain. Normal wear and tear excepted,
the condemnee has the right to have the property returned in its
original condition. It is impossible to make any award for such
speculative damages at the time of taking. It would be unjust to
force the Government to pay for damages it had not caused and
possibly might not. Although the condemnee may have suffered
injustice in past proceedings, nothing desirable is to be gained by
placing undue burdens on the Government. Purely speculative
losses should not be considered, but a method should be used which
would fully compensate the owner for his loss.
One solution was worked out in a case where the Government
had acquired temporary use of some tracts of land during World
War I. After determining the rental value, the court retained
jurisdiction to assess damages if the Government failed to return
the land in as good condition as when it took possession.2
Later cases held that condemnation proceedings were only to
determine just compensation for the taking. Some courts held that
they lacked the power to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of
determining damage claims arising out of the Government's use
of the property and that such claims would have to be presented
in original action.3 3 Should the Government move to dismiss the
2Id. at 860.
-323 U.S. 373, 383 (1945)
See Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in part, id. at 384.
In re Condemnation of Lands for Military Camp, 250 Fed. 314 (E.D. Ark.
1918).
'United States v. 16.747 Acres of Land, 50 F Supp. 389 (D. Del. 1943);
United States v. 5.741 Acres of Land, 51 F Supp. 147 (E.D. N.Y. 1943);
United States v. Improved Premises, 54 F. Supp. 469 (S.D. N.Y. 1944).
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condemnation proceeding, it cannot be continued to enable the
erstwhile condemnee to prove any damage done to the property.34
After the General Motors decision, the Government reversed its
stand. The Department of Justice 5 announced that it desired
damages caused by the Government's temporary occupancy to be
determined in the condemnation proceeding. To prevent the award-
ing of purely conjectural damages, it instructed its attorneys to
request the court to retain jurisdiction so that compensation for
the Government's failure to properly restore the property would
not be fixed until the property was returned to the condemnee.
This procedure has been followed. In a 1946 case,"0 the Govern-
ment appropriated the temporary use of defendant's hstel. The
award of compensation, agreed to by the parties, was to be full
compensation except for any claims that might arise for damages
caused by major structural changes. To make future awards, if
the right to them arose and the parties failed to agree, the court
retained plenary jurisdiction. After possession of the hotel was
surrendered, the defendant petitioned for damages resulting from
changes made to it. Referring to the Department of Justice bul-
letin heretofore noted,37 the court held that it must carry out the
express agreement of the litigants. These damages had been antici-
pated, but could not have been determined at the time of the
original proceedings. Rather than relegate the defendant to another
forum or force him to file an original action, the court would
determine the further award.3
The option to renew the lease from year to year, acquired by
the Government in most condemnations, presents another problem.
It is certainly a property right taken from the condemnee, render-
ing uncertain the time when he may regain occupancy. In United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,'3 the circuit court of appeals
has recently ruled that the lessee's removal costs should be con-
sidered in determining the amount of compensation where the
Government by exercising the option prolonged its occupancy
beyond the term of the lease. The circuit court held that the General
Motors decision was applicable to the situation presented. 40 The
court, to strengthen its position, relied on the idea expressed by
Mr. Justice Rutledge in the Petty case4' that the General Motors
ruling was applicable whenever the Government chopped up the
" United States v. Certain Parcel of Land, 51 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. N.Y.
1943).
' Department of Justice, Circular No. 3534, Bulletin No. 34, June 22, 1945.
' United States v. Certain Lands, 66 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
, See note 35 supra.
'United States v. Certain Lands, supra note 12, at 575.
170 F. 2d 752 (C.C.A. 1st 1948).
' See note 25 supra. I See note 27 supra.
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lessee's interest. The holding seems sound. If these costs were not
considered, the tenant would have to wait until its term expired, or
the Government surrendered occupancy, before it could be certain
that it would no longer be responsible under its lease. The injustice
of denying the condemnee's costs is not as glaring as when a portion
of its lease will definitely not be used by the Government, but the
uncertainty here is wholly created by the Government. If it ac-
quired a definite term when it originally took the use, no obstacle
bars a later condemnation proceeding to acquire another term. The
Government has the power to make certain what it has made un-
certain and it should not complain when the award in the latter
instance is based on somewhat speculative elements .4 2
A dissenting judge in the Westnghouse case pointed out that
since the actual effect of the Government occupancy was to ex-
tinguish the entire term of the tenant, these consequential losses
should not be considered. 43 He istated, however, that neither he nor
his brethren had complete confidence in their inferences drawn
from the two Supreme Court cases and that they would welcome a
review of this matter by the Supreme Court.4 4
Following a strictly legalistic process of reasoning the Govern-
ment could avoid liability for removal costs by taking a term longer
than the tenant's, retaining the right to surrender earlier. Com-
pensation would be based solely on the annual rental value. To
prevent this procedure by the Government, the court could retain
jurisdiction until the occupancy was actually terminated. Until
then, removal costs would be held in abeyance. The majority in the
Westinghouse case thought it significant that the Supreme Court
has made no mention of this procedure.4-
The General Motors decision appears to mean that the hard
and fast rules of the past for determining compensation may be
made the subject of a more critical examination. While they may
not be overthrown or changed, at least they will be examined to see
whether they produce harsh results. If they do, a standard should
be adopted which more fully compensates the condemnee. The right
to acquire property by condemnation is not questioned. But such a
proceeding is a forced, not a voluntary, transaction. Use of the
market value concept presupposes a willing seller, and he seldom
exists in a condemnation proceeding. Many elements considered
consequential under the market value concept would be considered
in the price-fixing process in a voluntary sale.
Principles of law evolved during a century and a half of expan-
'See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 55 F Supp. 257, 265 (D.
Md. 1944).
170 F 2d 752, 756 (C.C.A. 1st 1948) (dissenting opinion per Magruder,
C.J.).
" Id. at 759. ' Id. at 756.
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sion and development are not to be overthrown because instances
arise where injustice occurs. Law has served its purpose-and
served it well-when substantial justice is accomplished.
The law of eminent domain is fashioned out of the con-
flict between the people's interest in public projects and the
principle of indemnity to the landowner.46
In balancing these interests, actual losses to the condemnee,
which are caused by the taking and are susceptible of fairly ac-
curate pecuniary valuation, should be considered in determining the
award. The award would then be closer to being an equivalent of
just compensation.
Because these rules are well established, it may be that they
should only be changed by Congress,47 but an alternative method
was recognized by Dean McCormick:
Strong reasons of policy and fairness support the view
that recompense for these losses should be specifically au-
thorized by the Legislature, or should be sanctioned by the
courts where the way is open, by the use of the concept, not
of "market value," but of "value to the owner. ' 8
Ralph N. Mahaffey
Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS-TAKING PROPERTY
FOR PRIVATE USE
The assignee of a life insurance policy applied to defendant in-
surance company for a paid-up policy and a loan. Defendant refused,
stating that consent of the assignor's wife was necessary, she hav-
ing acquired an interest therein under the Pennsylvania Commu-
nity Property Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 201 et seq (1947).
The last premium had been paid with funds received by the as-
signor after the effective date of the Law, consisting of the income
from a trust, set up years previously, and income from stocks pur-
chased in 1943. Assignee brought a bill in equity for a mandatory
injunction. Held, injunction granted. The Community Property
Law is unconstitutional in that it transfers one person's property
to another without the owner's consent. Wilcox v. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A. 2d 521 (1947).
Holding that the Community Property Law by purporting to
transfer the right to one-half of the future income of the trusts
and the stocks, in effect transferred previously vested rights, the
"United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
See Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in part, United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 384 (1945).
" AICCORNMICK, DAMAGES 542 (1935)
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court said, "If an Act of assembly . . operates retroactively to take
what is, by existing law, the property of one man, and transfer it
to another, with or without compensation, it is in violation of that
clause in the Bill of Rights, Constitution, Article IX, Section 9,
which declares that no man can be deprived of his . . property
unless by. . the law of the land." This reasoning is grounded in
the early American conception of a legally limited government. In
1792 a state court held that ".... it was against common right, as
well as against Magna Charta, to take away the freehold of one
man and give it to another...." Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252
(S.C. C.P. 1792). Constitutions of other states were held to pre-
clude such a transfer. Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304
(U.S. 1795) ; Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1 (1833) ; Jones Hezir v.
Perry, 10 Yerg. 58 (Tenn. 1836) Against this background recent
wage, social security; and other social legislation strikes a sharp
contrast, seemingly effecting what due process forbids-the trans-
fer of property from one man to another. Thus, contributions re-
quired from workers and employers arg put in a fund to pay
unemployment benefits to other workers, with the possibility that
the contributor may never receive any benefits therefrom. Is there
a real conflict here, or may we justify the apparent difference by
saying, "In the last analysis, nearly every law transfers something
from A to B?" LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS (1935).
A person claiming the protection of due process must be able to
show some actual damage. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330
(1935). Even where damage can be shown, "An ulterior public
advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of pri-
vate property for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use."
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911) ; Home Building
& Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) ; Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135 (1921). Where the injury to property is more significant,
indirectly benefitting others, the public interest in relation thereto
may be so great as to justify the damage, as where cedar trees are
destroyed to prevent damage to lucrative apple orchards, Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), or where brick making in a residen-
tial area is prohibited, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
These suggest that, where the public interest is great, less protec-
tion can be expected from the due process limitation. Another fac-
tor is suggested in the statement that the ". . . destruction of, or
injury to, property is frequently accomplished without a 'taking'
in the constitutional sense," Omna Commercial Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) ; the implication being that where the
taking is more direct, it will be prohibited or conditioned on com-
pensation. Thus a statute prohibiting a coal company from mining
its own property, in effect transferring a fee simple to the surface
[Vol. 10
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owner, was declared unconstitutional. "The extent of the taking is
great... [and] ... the damage is not common or public." Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). A railroad cannot
be forced to allow another to use its land. Missouri Pacific Ry. v.
Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). Production limits causing A's
natural gas to flow to B's land are void as a transfer of property,
there being no public purpose, such as the prevention of waste.
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
Thus, where significant damage is established, the elements to be
weighed are:
1. The magnitude of a bona fide public interest, in relation to
2. The directness of the transfer.
An example of the cases upholding ostensibly confiscatory leg-
islation is a decision upholding an order requiring a holding com-
pany to divest itself of its subsidiaries, the court saying, "...
Congress balanced the various considerations and concluded that
the right is clearly outweighed by the damage to the public. .. ."
North Amercan Co. v. SEC 327 U.S. 686 (1946). This seems in
complete accord with the above principles, the public interest being
great and the transfer indirect. This would apply to social legisla-
tion in general, expunging the alleged conflict between traditional
due process and modern legislation.
Applying these principles to the Wilcox case, it would seem that
the Pennsylvania court was warranted in its decision. There was
no public purpose such as the protection of the public health, safety,
or morals. The transfer was direct, the injury substantial. This




Petitioners, a white female and negro male, were denied a cer-
tificate of registry and a license to marry by the County Clerk of
the County of Los Angeles, California. Respondent invoked Cali-
foinia Civil Code Section 69 (1941), which provides: ". . no li-
cense may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person
with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race."
"All marriages of white persons with Negroes, Mongolians, mem-
bers of the Malay race, or mulattoes are illegal and void." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 60 (1941). In proceeding in mandamus, held, California
Civil Code Sections 60 and 69 are unconstitutional and the peremp-
tory writ must issue. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P. 2d (Cal. 1948)
The Supreme Court of California based its decision principally
on three grounds: 1. The statutes violate the equal protection of
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the laws clause of the United States Constitution by impairing the
right of individuals to marry on the basis of race alone. 2. The
statutes are too vague and uncertain to be enforceable regulations
of fundamental right. 3. The right to marry is included in the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom which is encompassed
in the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment and, there-
fore, in the absence of proof of a clear and present danger to public
peace and order, such restrictive statutes are void.
Marriage is more than a civil contract; it is a basic civil right
of free men. Sknner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The
right to marry is included in the concept of liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). However, for many years the regulation of marriage has
been recognized as a proper exercise of the state police power for
the protection of health, safety, and general welfare. Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). Bigamy and polygamy may be prohib-
ited. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) ; Davis v. Bea-
son, 133 U.S. 333 (1889). Premarital medical examinations for the
determination and prevention of the spread of venereal diseases
may be required. Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966
(1914).
Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, recognized the
"rational nexus" test for classification in equal protection cases,
i.e., that classification for regulation under the state police power
must bear a reasonable relation to a valid legislative objective.
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 277 U.S.
389 (1928) ; Gulf, C.& S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). But
he perceived no sufficient factual basis for the racial distinction
made in the statutes under consideration. Citing the works of
numerous authors on biology, anthropology, psychology, and related
fields, he concluded that there was neither the danger of physically
or intellectually inferior progeny nor a probability of extreme
social tension to merit the imposition of governmental restraint.
Legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone is
a denial of equal protection. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500
(1928) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
The dissenting judge in the principal case would allow consid-
erable legislative license in testing the equal protection contention.
It must be noted that the number of writers who find physical
degeneration, moral degradation, and public malcontent the result
of interracial marriage is equally impressive. As a general rule, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived which would sustain
a law, the existence of that state -of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911). Nevertheless, when a fundamental personal
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right, like marriage, is delimited, the advisability of requiring sub-
stantial proof of the validity of legislative classification according
to races seems apparent.
Mr. Justice Edmonds placed his concurring opinion solely on
the theory that the right to marry is grounded in the fundamental
principles of Christianity which are guaranteed in the First Amend-
ment, and which in turn are transmitted by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the states. When a statute interferes with the liberties pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the prime consideration is whether
or not there is any "clear and present danger" to the public justify-
ing such legislation. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ; Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The scope of the religious
freedom provision has not as yet been clearly defined by the Court.
The distribution of religious literature on public sidewalks is within
its protection. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945) ; Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). A person may refuse to serve
as a juror because of his religious belief. United States v. Hillyard,
52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943). However, the inclusion in the
First Amendment of the right to marry an individual of one's choice
merely because interracial marriages are recognized by the church
to which petitioners belong may be an unwarranted extension of
the original theory of religious freedom. See Reynolds v. United
States, supra.
In addition to Califorma, 29 other states have miscegenation
statutes. 1 VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWS 204 (1931). The
courts, when presented with the question of the constitutionality of
theue laws, have upheld them without exception. When statutes
treat each of the parties in the same manner and punish them to the
same extent, they do not contravene the equal protection of the laws
clause. Stevens v. United States, 146 F. 2d 120 (C.C.A. 10th 1944) ;
State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (E.D. Ga. 1890) ; Jackson v. Denver,
109 Colo. 196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942) ; Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29
Am. Rep. 739 (1877). Eight states, including Ohio, have removed
similar restrictions by legislative action.
Although it has never decided the question in point, the Supreme
Court did use the "equality of application" theory in upholding an
Alabama statute which imposed a heavier penalty for the crimes of
adultery and fornication when committed by a white person and a
Negro than a similar statute imposed when the same acts were com-
mitted by people of the same race. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1882). However, last year, in declaring a racial restrictive cov-
enant unconstitutional, the Court finally rejected this specious doc-
trine and announced that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to guarantee individual rights to all. "Equal protection
of the laws is not achieved through the indiscriminate imposition of
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inequalities." Shelley v. Kraemer, 92 L. Ed. 845, 856 (1948). This
pronouncement seems to indicate that the final step in placing the
colored man on a plane of absolute, individual equality with the
white man may be the guarantee of the right to marry the person
whom he chooses.
H. James Funkhouser
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-POLICE POWER AND THE 14TH AMENDMENT
A number of morticians formed a life insurance company early
in 1948 for the purpose of selling "burial" or a "pre-paid funeral"
type life insurance. Agents for the new company were usually
morticians or their employees. All but one of the stockholders of
the new company were morticians. An act was passed in the state
legislature making it unlawful for any life insurance company, its
officers, agents, or employees, to own, operate or maintain a funeral
or undertaking business; or contract or agree with any funeral or
undertaking establishment to conduct the funeral of any person
insured by such an insurance company, or for any funeral or under-
taking establishment, its agents, officers, or employees to be licensed
as agents, salesmen, or solicitors for any life insurance company
doing business in this state. Act S.C. April 14, 1948, §§ 1-6, 45
St. at Large, p. - Plaintiffs sought an injunction in a federal
three-judge court to enjoin enforcement of the statute on the
grounds that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held, injunction granted, the stat-
ute is unconstitutional. Family Security Life Insurance Co. v. Dan-
sel, 79 F. Supp. 62, (E.D. S.C. 1948).
Police powers may be defined broadly as those powers of the
state to pass legislation which relates to the safety, health, morals,
and general welfare of the public. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). It extends to the control of every action and event on
part of its citizens having to do with public welfare. Brents v. Stone,
60 F. Supp. 82 (D.C. Ill. 1945). Insurance has long been regarded
as a business affecting the public welfare. States may fix insurance
rates, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewts, 233 U.S. 389 (1913) ;
may regulate compensation of insurance agents, O'Gorman and
Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1930) ; and may
drastically curtail the area of free contract in insurance contracts.
Natonal Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922). Un-
dertaking has also been held to be of public concern. Walton v.
Commonwealth, 187 Va. 275, 46 S.E. 2d 373 (1948) ; State v. Black-
well, 196 S.C. 313, 13 S.E. 2d 433 (1941). However, ".... a state
may not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily inter-
fere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose
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unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them." Burns Bak-
ing Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1923). Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278
U.S. 105 (1928) (A statute requiring all drug stores to be owned
by licensed pharmacists is unreasonable and unnecessary).
In the principal case, the court, in holding the statute unconsti-
tutional, went into its legislative history, giving consideration to
the motives behind its enactment. It found that the statute was arbi-
rary and capricious, that it was passed to destroy the plaintiff's
businesses, and that it was not passed to protect the public interest.
The legislature of South Carolina in studying the social and
economic facts affecting the public welfare apparently found evi-
dence that the combination of the two businesses would present
opportunities for certain business practices of an undesirable
nature. Such an insurance-undertaker combination might dis-
courage others from entering the field of undertaking. The com-
mission rate to the agents on the insurance was markedly low but
presumably this would be compensated for by the subsequent charge
for the funeral.
An existing South Carolina statute (S.C. CODE ANN. § 7984
1942) forbids the payment of the principal of an insurance policy
in services or merchandise. The undertaker-insurer due to his
advantageous position would probably be able to secure many of
his policyholders' funerals, thereby substantively circumventing
this statute, inasmuch as he would be exchanging or indirectly sub-
stituting the funeral service for the principal of the insurance
policy. The statute in controversy might have been an attempt to
plug this loophole in the existing statute.
Could the legislature reasonably conclude that evil was present
and that the state police power should be invoked to cope with it?
The majority of the court thought not. In evaluating the majority
decision it may be observed that the new life insurance-undertaking
combination was less than one year old when this case was tried.
During such a short period of time it is not likely that inherent
evils in this combination would suddenly blossom into full maturity.
However, court decisions seem to indicate that when the legislature
reasonably determines that a danger to the public exists, the legis-
lature need not postpone action until someone is victimized before
it can protect the remainder of the public.
Judge Dobie, in the dissenting opinion, pointed out the broad
police powers of the state in controlling businesses affecting the
public welfare and that there is a presumption that statutes regu-
lating such businesses are valid. Formerly the United States Su-
preme Court seemed willing to nullify police power statutes if
there was substantial evidence of violation of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The views
1949]
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of Justices Holmes and Brandeis expressed in their many dissenting
opinions indicated that the legislature should be given greater free-
dom in the exercise of such powers. The standard they adopted
would require considerably more than substantial evidence of un-
constitutionality to justify nullifying the work of the legislature.
They ddopted the standard that if no reasonable person trained in
law could call the statute constitutional, then the statute should be
nullified; in other cases the validity of the statute should be sus-
tained. Judge Dobie observes that the present United States Su-
preme Court is following the views of Justices Holmes and Brandeis
in this area of the law and, therefore, the statute in the principal
case should be held constitutional.
L. Dennis Marlowe
EQUITY-BILL FOR DECLARATION OF OBSCENITY
AGAINST NOVEL "FOREVER AMBER"
A petition was filed in equity by the Attorney General against
the novel Forever Amber seeking a judicial declaration that the
book was obscene, indecent, or impure. The action was brought
under MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 272, §§ 28C-28G (Supp. 1948), which
allows an action against the book itself and provides that a decla-
ration of obscenity given under the above sections raises conclusive
presumptions as to knowledge of obscenity under the criminal
section, 28B. Held, that the novel Forever Amber is not obscene,
indecent, or impure within the meaning of the statute. Attorney
General v. The Book Named Forever Amber, 81 N.E. 2d 663 (Mass.
1948).
The statute was amended to its present form in 1945, with a
minor change not material to the principal case in 1948. MAsS.
ANN. LAws c. 272, § 28 (1948 Supp.). A similar procedure was
suggested by Professor Chaff~e in 1940. Chaffee, Censorship of
Plays and Books, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REVIEW 16, 21 (1940). The
procedure was approved by BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
1035 (2d ed. 1941). However, both Chaffee and Borchard recog-
nized possible constitutional problems of freedom of the press. See
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
In the principal case no mention is made of a constitutional ques-
tion. It is probable that it was not pleaded by the parties and prop-
erly raised before the court. It is evident that the Attorney General
would not seek to invalidate the statute, neither would the defend-
ants as the act relieved booksellers and publishers from the risk of
an adjudication of obscenity in a criminal action and from heeding
the mandates of private censorship organizations. Commonwealth
v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945). It has been sug-
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gested that the large number of cases arising under the former
criminal obscenity statute was due to the forceful efforts of Boston's
Watch and Ward Society. American Mercury, Inc., v. Chase, 13 F.
2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926) ; Note, 40 ILL. L. REv. 421, n. 28 (1945).
For a complete report of censorship in Massachusetts, see Grant
and Angoff, Massachusetts and Censorship, 10 B. U. L. REV. 36-60,
147-194 (1930). The constitutionality of the former criminal stat-
ute was adjudicated and upheld, the court stating, ". . the subject
matter is well within one of the most obvious and necessary
branches of the police power of the state." Commonwealth v. Alli-
son, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265 (1917).
Massachusetts has had an obscenity statute since 1711. See
ANCIENT CHARTER, COLONY LAWS AND PROVINCE LAW OF MASS.
BAY OF 1814. The substance of the act as amended in 1835 has been
in effect until the present procedure was adopted. Since 1890 the
statute has had two standards that would bring a book within its
purview. "Whoever ... sells a book . containing obscene, inde-
cent, or impure language or manifestly tending to corrupt the mor-
als of youth.... ." ACTS OF 1890, c. 70.
In the first important case considered by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, no differentiation was made between the
standards. Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346, 86 N.E. 910
(1909). However, the case is significant because it is considered
to have injected into Massachusetts law the Lord Cockburn test
for obscenity Lord Cockburn stated as the test: "... whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and cor-
rupt those whose minds are open to immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." Regina v. Hicklin,
:3 Q.B. 360 (1868) The test was approved by subsequent decisions.
Commonwealth v. Allison, supra; Commonwealth v. Frtede, 271
Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930). The evident scope of such a test
led Judge Learned Hand to expressly repudiate it in a federal deci-
sion. United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (C.C.A. 2d 1936).
For ways in which obscenity questions may arise under federal
statutes, see Note, 40 ILL. REv. 421 n. 27 (1945).
In 1930 the Supreme Judicial Court held on the authority of
the Buckley case, supra, that the jury should consider only those
parts of the book that are alleged to be obscene and not the book as
a whole. Commoniwealth v. Fri ede, supra. For criticism, see 37
W. VA. L. QUAR. 103 (1930). Later that year the legislature
amended the statute. Where formerly it read, "Whoever ... sells
... a book containing obscene language.. .," it read after amend-
ment, "Whoever ... sells ... a book . which is obscene ......
MASS. GEN. LAWS, c. 162 (1930).
It would seem that even if Lord Cockburn's test were still used,
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the court would have more leeway in determining obscenity since
the book would have to be considered as a whole. The alleged
obscene material could be considered in its context and its interrela-
tionship with other matter. In the first case arising under the
amended statute, the book was considered as a whole but still found
to be obscene. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, supra. A distinction
was drawn between the two standards noted above. The court found
that the first standard, that the material was obscene, had been
violated, thereby necessarily violating the second standard, cor-
ruption of the morals of youth. The court cited in a list of cases
used for its test of obscenity Regina v. Hicklin, supra, but it stated
as the test, ". . . the effect is to be found in the effect of the book
upon its probable readers. . ." It would seem that this is a more
narrow test than Lord Cockburn's, a test of the reaction upon
the masses into whose hands the book will probably fall, not a test
of the effect on those into whose hands the book may fall.
The principal case relies upon the Isenstadt case for all of its
authority except for a procedural question. The court, while rec-
ognizing certain sections to be in bad taste and tending toward
vulgarity, laid stress upon the lack of detail in the sexual episodes
and in the overall tenor of the book, expressing the opinion that a
reader would not envy the life of those present about Charles II
but would feel only abhorrence. The effect of this one decision on
the overall censorship pattern is doubtful. It is significant that the
court found the book not to be obscene when, viewing its past atti-
tude, it could easily have found otherwise.
It is believed that the ultimate determination of obscenity must
rest in the discretion of the court despite such statements as made
in the Isenstadt case, supra, ".... it is not our function to assume a
liberal attitude or a conservative attitude. As in other cases of
statutory construction and application it is our plain but not neces-
sarily easy duty to read the words of the statutes in the sense they
were intended. . . ." If illiberality is reflected in the judicial deci-
sions it is a reflection that the courts view the mores of contempo-
rary society as a static rather than a dynamic concept.
Earl E. Stephenson
FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION-POWER TO GRANT BAIL
IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
An alien was arrested and held in custody without bail pending
deportation proceedings. Before the hearing directed by the war-
rant could be held, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the
grounds that the action of the Attorney General in denying bail
was arbitrary and capricious and in contravention of petitioner's
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rights under the Constitution. The District Court dismissed the
writ on the grounds that the discretion of the Attorney General in
refusing bail in such a case is not subject to review in the present
proceedings. Held, reversing and remanding, that the decision of
the Attorney General is subject to review and shall be reversed if
found that bail was withheld arbitrarily. United States ex rel.
Potash v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization at
the Port of New York, 169 F. 2d 747 (C.C.A. 2d 1948).
Statutory authority to grant bail pending final disposal of the
case of any alien taken into custody was granted to the immigra-
tion officials in 1907. 34 STAT. 904 (1907) as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1946). The majority of the courts, including the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have held the statute was
not mandatory but gave a discretionary power to the official.
United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director of Irmmigration, 120
F. 2d 762 (C.C.A. 2d 1941). Accord: Ex parte Perkov, 45 F. Supp.
864 (S.D. Cal. 1942). Contra: Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d 422
(C.C.A. 6th 1926).
There is no statutory authority for courts to grant bail in such
cases. The power has been given, however, in criminal cases, REV.
STAT. § 1015 (1878), 18 U.S.C. § 596 (1946), and in civil cases
where the person is arrested on mesne process or execution issued
from any court of the United States, REV. STAT. § 991 (1878), 28
U.S.C. § 844 (1946), but it has been held that neither applies to de-
portation proceedings. United States ex rel. Carter v. Curran, 297
Fed. 946, 951 (C.C.A. 2d 1924) ; 36 A.L.R. 877.
At common law the power to grant bail was inherent in the
courts. Queen v. Spilsbury, 2 A.B. 615 (1898). Since the -federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, deriving their power from
statute, not the common law, BREWSTER, FEDERAL PROcEDuRE § 23
(1940), some courts deny bail in deportation proceedings on the
theory that the power to grant bail is not a mere matter of practice
but is strictly dependent on statute. Chin Wah v. Colwell, 187 Fed.
592 (C.C.A. 9th 1911) ; see Bongiovanni v. Ward, 50 F. Supp. 3,4
(D. Mass. 1943). Under this view, it is argued that the immigra-
tion official has the sole authority to fix bail and the decision is final.
Ex parte Perkov, supra, at 867. Other federal courts have held
that there is inherent power to admit to bail unless forbidden by
statute. Principe v. Ault, 62 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ohio 1945) ; Note
19 So. CALIF. L. REV. 458; see Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 756
(C.C.A. 8th 1915). Other inherent powers have long been recog-
nized in the federal courts, for example the power to punish for
contempt, which in the words of one court ". . . was as much a
part of the law of the United States as if ordained by a specific
provision of a statute...." In re Neagle, 39 Fed. 833, 857 (C.C.N.C.
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Cal. 1889). If power to grant bail is inherent in the court, it may
still be exercised as the 1907 statute did not purport to remove
any of the court's power but merely reposed primary authority in
the immigration officials. Thus the alien may seek bail from the
immigration officials, and if refused apply to the courts.
Judicial review of administrative proceedings is of long stand-
ing and is based on the principle that the administrative process
must be in accordance with the standard of due process of law.
The Japanese Immigration Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). It is not lim-
ited to immigration cases. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114
(1946) (selective service case). The general immigration laws make
no provision for judicial review, but it has not been lacking, as the
numerous cases in the reports of the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts testify. See VAN VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
TROL OF ALIENS 149 (1932). Some sections of the immigration acts
expressly provide that the decision of the official shall be final. 39
STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1946). But in the words of one
court, ". . . this does not mean the courts cannot do anything about
it." United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F. 2d 457, 460
(C.C.A. 3d 1948). Some courts have reviewed the decisions of the
immigration officials in denying bail, with no mention of the source
of their power to do so. Colyer v. Skeflngton, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass.
1920) ; United States ex rel. Soannis v. Garfinkle, 44 F Supp. 518
(W.D. Pa. 1942).
Where the power given to the official is discretionary the court
review is limited to the issue of reasonableness. United States ex
rel. Georgan v. Uhl, 271 Fed. 676 (C.C.A. 2d 1921). Thus, in the
instant case, the decision of the Attorney General will be reversed
only upon a clear showing that he acted without foundation. There-
fore, there can be little weight to a claim that the courts are usurp-
ing the administrative functions by such review.
Whether the decision in the principal case is based upon the
inherent power of a court to grant bail, or the concept that adminis-
trative proceedings are subject to review, the result is that such
review, if not perfunctory, will act as a brake upon the possibility
of arbitrary administrative action.
C. Stanley Taylor
LABOR LAW-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-
COST-PLUS-FIXED-FEE 'CONTRACTOR
During World War II, plaintiffs were employees of a cost-plus-
fixed-fee contractor. Some of the employees were engaged under
one contract in the construction of a naval training camp and
advance base depot; on another contract others were employed for
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the maintenance and operation of the camp and base. Under the
latter contract, materials and equipment purchased by the defend-
ant were unloaded and later shipped to overseas destinations.
Plaintiffs brought an action against the contractor for overtime
pay, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216
(b) (1946). The Circuit Court held that the employees were not
within the Act. On certiorari the Supreme Court dismissed the
action of the construction workers, vacated the judgment as to the
rest of the plaintiffs and remanded for further clarification of the
facts. Reed v. Murphey, 168 F. 2d 257 (C.C.A. 5th 1948), rev'd and
remanded per cwliam, 93 L. Ed. 91 (1948).
To qualify under the Fair Labor Standards Act it is essential
that the employee be "... engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce." 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 206 (a) (1946). The Act defines "commerce" as ".. trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among
the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof
. .. "; "employer" as, ". . . any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall
not include the United States .. ."; "goods" as ". . . goods (includ-
ing ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities,
merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character,
or any part or any ingredient thereof, but does not include goods
after their delivery into the actual possession of the ultimate con-
sumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor
thereof." 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203
(b) (d) (i) (1946).
In the principal case, the circuit court stated, "There can be no
commerce in war equipment.... Congress did not intend to include
within its (the act's) coverage war activities of a government cost-
plus-fixed-fee contractor involving no peacetime competition and no
marketing of goods in commerce." Reed v. Murphey, supra at 262.
In support of these propositions the court cited a similar case that
was subsequently remanded for determination of the facts. Ken-
vedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1947). It would appear
that the constitutional power given to Congress to regulate com-
merce is not confined to commercial or business transactions but
includes the transportation of persons and property no less than
purchase, sale and exchange of commodities; goods may move in
commerce though they never enter the field of commercial compe-
tition. Bell v. Porter, 159 F. 2d 117 (C.C.A. 7th 1947). Admitting
that the transportation of materials from the base depot was an act
of sovereignty, this alone would not exempt the defendant from
complying with the provision of the Act. The sovereign, through
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its Congress, had a right to include within the provisions of the
act the transportation of articles by the sovereign itself. Timber-
lake v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. Iowa 1943).
Where an employer was engaged in production of guns and other
vital war materials which were delivered to representatives of the
Army and Navy at the employer's plant, subsequent transportation
of the goods across state lines by the Government to its military
facilities was "interstate commerce" within the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act. Burke v. Mesta Mach. Co., 79 F Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa.
1948).
Assuming that the activities of the defendant contractor were
within the coverage of the Act, the individual plaintiffs still have
the burden of proving that they, as distinguished from their em-
ployer, were engaged in commerce or production of goods for com-
merce, or that a substantial part of their activities was so closely
related to commerce as to bring them within the Act. Work in
original construction is usually said to be intrastate in character.
Parham v. Austin Co., 158 F 2d 566 (C.C.A. 5th 1946). However,
some of the work under the maintenance and operation contract
might satisfy the Act's requirements. Unloading of an interstate
shipment is so closely related to interstate commerce that it may
be an integral part of the interstate journey. B. & 0. Southwestern
Ry. v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 539 (1923) ; Connell v. Vermilya-Brown Co.,
164 F. 2d 924 (C.C.A. 2d 1947) ; Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F. 2d 348
(C.C.A. 10th 1944). Maintenance of buildings and equipment used
in interstate commerce has been held to be within the purview of
the Act. Overstreet v. North Shore Co., 318 U.S. 125 (1942) ; Wall-
ing v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 134 F. 2d 945 (C.C.A. 6th 1943).
The emotional influence of wartime experiences which the Cir-
cuit Court exhibited in the principal case seems hardly justifiable
in the light of current and proposed peacetime spending for national
defense. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted with the broad
purpose of raising substandard wages of certain members of the
labor ranks and the Act may be extended to some of the present
plaintiffs when the Supreme Court decides the case on the merits.
David W. Hart
QUASI-CONTRACTS-FAMILY RELATION DOCTRINE-UNENFORCEABLE
ORAL CONTRACTS AS EVIDENCE
Plaintiff alleged an express oral contract with his father, who
had promised to give an equal share of the profits of his lumber
business to plaintiff and bequeath him the business by his will. In
return, plaintiff promised to devote all his time to the lumber con-
cern and relinquish his trucking business. The plaintiff performed
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under the agreement for 111/2 years until his father's death. Prior
to, and during this time, the plaintiff lived apart from his father
and supported a family of his own. The father having defaulted,
the plaintiff sues the estate for the value of his services. The trial
court gave judgment for the defendant on the pleadings. Held,
reversed and cause remanded. While the express contract is not
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, plaintiff states a cause of
action in quantum meruit. There is no presumption of gratuity
inferred from the relation of these parties, since they are not mem-
bers of the same household, and in any event, evidence of the
express agreement rebuts the presumption. Bemis v. Bemss, 83
Ohio App. 93, 82 N.E. 2d 757 (1948).
In general, the existence of an express contract precludes quasi-
contractual recovery of benefits conferred. Walker v. Brown, 28
Ill. 378 (1862); Clenzdennen v. Paulsen, 3 Mo. 230 (1833) But
where the contract is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
and the plaintiff has no other remedy, he may recover in quantum
meruit for the value of the services rendered. Towsley v. Moore,
30 Ohio St. 184 (1876) ; Quirk v. Bank of Commerce, 157 C.C.A.
130, 244 Fed. 682 (C.C.A. 6th 1917) ; Hensley v. Hilton, 191 Ind.
309, 131 N.E. 38 (1921) ; Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E.
835 (1909). The statute does not preclude this remedy because it
was not designed to prevent the recovery for benefits conferred.
Newbold v. Michael, 110 Ohio St. 588, 144 N.E. 715 (1924) ; Pan-
coast v. Eldridge, 134 Okla. 247, 273 Pac. 255 (1928); RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 355 (1932).
When the plaintiff shows he has conferred benefits on the de-
fendant, who should have reasonably expected to pay for them,
the law implies an obligation to pay. Nutt v. Minor, 14 How. 464
(U.S. 1852); In re Talty, 232 Iowa 280, 5 N.W 2d 584 (1942);
Tozwsley a'. Moore, supra; Milliken v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110
N.Y. 403, 18 N.E. 251 (1888) ; WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CON-
TRACTS 9 (1913). On the other hand, if the parties are in some
proximity of family relationship, a presumption of gratuity is
generally raised. The rationale of this rule is that persons con-
nected by family ties ordinarily perform reciprocal services without
expectation of payment. Hinkle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St. 256, 65 N.E.
999 (1902) ; Scattergood v. Ingram, 86 Ohio St. 76, 98 N.E. 923
(1912) ; Merrick v. Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 110 N.E. 993 (1915).
The term "family" does not accurately describe the relationship
the courts have required to raise the presumption. In the present
case, the presumption was not applied because the parties did not
live in the same household, although they were closely related by
blood. This limitation has been accepted by other courts. Page v.
Page, 73 N.H. 305, 61 Atl. 356 (1905) ; Kerr v. Wilson, 284 Pa.
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541, 131 Atl. 468 (1926). Conversely, the doctrine has been applied
where the parties are not connected by blood or marriage, when
they lived together in a household. Anderson v. Houpt, 43 Ohio
App. 538, 184 N.E. 29 (1932). The conclusion suggested is that the
relationship which raises the presumption of gratuity is one of
household affinity rather than of blood or marriage. The rationale
of reciprocal dependency supports this interpretation. Cf. Havig-
hurst, Serwces in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in Do-
mestic Relations, 41 YALE L. J. 386 (1932).
In the present case, the court indicated that the plaintiff could
introduce the express oral contract as evidence of the father's inten-
tion to pay, although it was unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds. In theory, an agreement such as this is both an oral con-
tract and an oral admssion against interest, and in the latter sense
is evidence of a non-contractual obligation. Moore v. Capewell
Horse-Nail Co., 76 Mich. 606, 43 N.W. 644 (1889); WOODWARD,
op. cit. supra at 163. Therefore, the policy of the statute is not
violated when the evidence is admitted. Clark v. Boltz, 10 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 51, 29 Ohio C.C. 665 (1908) ; Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal.
80, 193 Pac. 84 (1920) ; McKeon v. Van Slyck, 223 N.Y. 392, 119
N.E. 851 (1918) ; Ellis v. Cary, 74 Wis. 176, 42 N.W. 252 (1889).
The application of a presumption of gratuity would have in-
creased the quantum of proof necessary to entitle the plaintiff to
recover. But, the showing of an express promise such as alleged in
the principal case is uniformly held to be sufficient to overcome the
presumption. Hinkle v. Sage, supra, Scattergood v. Ingram, supra;
Merrick v. Ditzler, supra; Lemunyon v. Newcomb, 120 Ohio St. 55,
155 N.E. 533 (1929). Thus, it seems that while the court properly
refused to apply the presumption, this holding was unnecessary in
.rder to sustain the plaintiff's pleadings.
Bryce W. Kendall
TORTS-CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-
SOLDIERS EXCLUDED AS A CLASS
Suit by injured soldier, and administrator of a deceased soldier,
for damages resulting from personal injury and wrongful death
in a collision between the private automobile in which soldiers were
riding, while on furlough, and a negligently operated Army truck.
The action was brought under the provisions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 60 STAT. 842, 28 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1946). Judgment
for plaintiffs in the District Court and the United States appeals.
Held, judgment reversed; soldiers are given no right to sue the
United States under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
United States v. Brooks, 169 F. 2d 840 (C.C.A. 4th 1948).
Before the Tucker Act, 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 41
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(1946), Congress provided compensation for personal injuries or
property damage caused by the negligence of employees of the
United States through passage of private bills. To relieve itself of
some of this legislative burden, the district courts were given juris-
diction by this Act over cases based on contract claims or claims
founded on the Constitution, acts of Congress, or regulations of
executive departments, not exceeding $10,000. This Act did not
include cases sounding in tort.
Jurisdiction was later extended to tort liability in Admiralty
cases where damages resulted from the operation of merchant ves-
sels by the Government. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742
(1946). Jurisdiction in Admiralty was later extended to public
vessels of the United States. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781
(1946). Congress had previously granted jurisdiction to the dis-
trict courts in certain types of suits for damages for infringement
of patents by the Government. 36 STAT. 851, 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1910).
The modern trend, among the English speaking nations, to abolish
sovereign immunity to tort actions, together with the desire of Con-
gress to free itself from the ever-increasing burden of considering
special claim bills, prompted passage of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, which was Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 60
STAT. 812-852 (1946) For the history of the administrative settle-
ment of claims against the United States, see Walker, Admntstra-
tive Settlement of Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9
OHIO ST. L. J. 445 (1948).
The courts have consistently held, in tort cases under the Public
Vessels Act, supra, that Congress did not mean to relieve members
of the naval forces from risks of injuries incidental to their service.
Recovery was denied for the death of a naval officer killed in a col-
lision at sea, while on active duty. Dobson v. United States, 27 F. 2d
807 (C.C.A. 2d 1928). Following this case, the same court later held
that because of the compensation elsewhere provided for such per-
sons, they must be deemed excluded from its [Public Vessels Act]
protection. Bradley v. United States, 151 F. 2d 742 (C.C.A. 2d
1945) In like manner, under the Railroad Control Act of 1918, 40
STAT. 451 (1918), which provided Government operation of the
railroads, it was held that a soldier injured by the negligent opera-
tion of a railroad had no valid action against the United States.
Saldoral v. Davs, 288 Fed. 56 (C.C.A. 6th 1923). See Dohn v.
Daci.s, 258 U.S. 421 (1922).
The common feature in these cases is the fact that the injuries
occurred while the servicemen were on active duty Since Congress,
in anticipation of injuries in line of duty, had provided a system of
compensation and medical treatment, it seems reasonable that any
further claims be excluded.
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Section 410 (a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra, pro-
vides that:
i the United States district court... shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction to... render judgment on any claim against
the United States, for money only ... under circumstances
where the United States, if a prvate person, would be liable
to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred ... the United States shall be liable ... in the
same manner, and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)
The 12 exceptions to the act are phrased with regard to the
nature of the activity giving rise to the claim. Section 421 provides:
"The provisions of this title shall not apply to ... (j). Any claim
arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war."
Among the acts of Congress repealed by the Federal Tort Claims
Act, supra, was the Military Personnel Claims Act of July 3, 1943.
57 STAT. 372 (1943), as amended, 59 STAT. 225 (1945), 31 U.S.C.
§ 223b (1946). The Act contained this exception: ". . . the provi-
sions of this act shall not be applicable to claims.., of military per-
sonnel . . .for personal injury or death of such persons, if such
... injury or death occurs ncident to their service." (Emphasis
supplied.) Thus Congress, in excluding the administrative settle-
ment of claims of military personnel, did so on the basis of how
and when they occurred and not on the basis of classes of claim-
ants. The court, by its decision here, has provided this exception,
holding that the maxim expressio unus est exclusio altermus is by no
means a rule of statutory interpretation to be universally applied,
and that since the exceptions are set out in terms of the nature of
the activity giving rise to the claim, it is here inapplicable as to
exceptions in terms of classes of claimants. See Leslie Anderson,
Tort and Implied Contract Lsability of the Federal Government, 30
MINN. L. REV. 133, 151 (1946)
Other courts in considering this aspect of the Military Tort
Claims Act, supra, have distinguished between injury occurring
as an incident of service and otherwise. In Jefferson v. United
States, 74 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1947), (Motion to dismiss over-
ruled) ; 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), heavily relied upon in the
principal case, the court, while holding that a claim, arising out of
an injury sustained in an operation negligently performed on a
soldier while on active duty, was excluded from the provisions of
the Act, implied that a distinction would exist in case of an injury
received not incidental to service. The Government in that case
took the position that the Military Claims Act, supra, ".... is indica-
tive of the general policy of Congress not to recognize claims by
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military personnel for injuries occurring incident to their service."
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Sampson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1947),
the court appears to adopt a more logical approach, holding that the
Act must be construed in the light of the law which it supplants,
and, noting the repeal of the Military Personnel Claims Act, supra,
denied the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mont. 1948).
The exception read into the Act by the ruling of the principal
case apparently places the active members of the Armed Forces
in a unique class which is denied any rights under the Act. Quaere.
Would a serviceman be denied the right to bring an action for the
wrongful death of his wife, caused by the negligence of a Govern-
ment employee or for damage to his private property by negligent
Governmental employees? The answer from the express provisions
of the Act seems clear, but for the holding of the principal case.
A. J. Prendergast, Jr.
TORTS--GUEST STATUTE-"IN OR UPON MOTOR VEHICLE"
CONSTRUED
Defendant motorist had transported plaintiff to a social gather-
ing. Before beginning the return trip, plaintiff entered the auto-
mobile but when defendant could not find her keys the plaintiff
alighted from the car and stepped away from it about two feet. The
defendant stepped on the starter with the result that the car moved
backward for a short distance and stopped. In its movement, it
struck and injured the plaintiff. At the trial, defendant moved for
a directed verdict, relying on the Ohio guest statute. OHIO GEN.
CODE § 6308-6 (1945). The trial court overruled this motion and
the cause was submitted to the jury upon the theory of ordinary
negligence. There was a verdict for the plaintiff and defendant
appealed on questions of law. Held, judgment affirmed. The court
said that the plaintiff was not "in or upon said motor vehicle" and
was not a "guest" within the statute. Eshelman v. Wilson, 83 Ohio
App. 393, 80 N.E. 2d 803 (1948).
The present case involves a construction of the Ohio guest stat-
ute, Ohio General Code Section 6308-6 (1945) : "The operator...
of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising
from injuries to ... a guest, while being transported without pay-
ment therefor in or upon said vehicle, resulting from the operation
thereof, unless such injuries.., are caused by the wilful or wanton
misconduct of such operator ... of said motor vehicle." (Empha-
sis supplied.) The guest statute is in derogation of the common law
and according to the general legal policy of construction it should
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be strictly construed. Miller v. Kyle, 85 Ohio St. 186, 97 N.E. 372
(1911) ; Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N.E. 192 (1913) ;
Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E. 2d 217 (1943). Another
rule of construction, perhaps more pertinent in the instant case, is
that every word in a statute shall be given meaning, if possible.
Schraeder v. State, 28 Ohio App. 248, 162 N.E. 647 (1928).
Defendant contended that the statute should not be limited to
the requirement that the person transported be in or upon the
vehicle. The defendant further claimed that the guest status should
not be lost during the temporary interruption of a trip when the
passenger is in a zone near to the vehicle. No case in point has
heretofore been decided in Ohio. The language of the Ohio guest
law is followed in Alabama, ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 36, § 95 (1940),
but no case with a fact pattern similar to the one in the instant
case is reported for that jurisdiction. No other state seems to have
a-guest statute with the limiting words under consideration in the
Ohio law.
Massachusetts, without a statutory guest law but with a like
judicial principle, supports the claim of the defendant that one may
be a guest of the operator of an automobile while in the venture of
the transportation although not in or upon the vehicle. Bragdon v.
Dsnsmore, 312 Mass. 628, 45 N.E. 2d 833 (1942) ; Ruel v. Langelier,
299 Mass. 240, 12 N.E. 2d 735 (1937). The California guest law,
CALIF. VEHICLE CODE, § 403 (1948), has the limiting words "riding
in any vehicle," and it has been held that a person, alighting from
an automobile, with one foot on the ground and the other on the
running board when the car moves, is not within the meaning of
the act. Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P. 2d 729 (1940).
An examination of the decisions reveals a sharp conflict as to
when the guest statute attaches. Relief was given in an action for
injuries received by a person as the result of the operator's closing
the door. Nemoitsn v. Berger, 111 Conn. 80, 149 Atl. 233 (1930).
But it, has been held that an invitee, injured before entering the
automobile by the fall of the door in absence of the owner, is not
covered by such statute. Puckett v. Pailthorpe, 207 Iowa 613, 223
N.W. 254 (1929). Plaintiff was not "riding" in the automobile
within the meaning of the Iowa guest law while riding on a sled
hooked to defendant's automobile. Samuelson v. Sherrill, 225 Iowa
421, 280 N.W. 596 (1938). But a person riding on a toboggan
hitched to a bobsled attached to an automobile was being "trans-
ported" within the Michigan guest law. Langford v. Rogers, 278
Mich. 310, 270 N.W. 692 (1936).
The decided cases seem to indicate that, as a general proposi-
tion, an occupant of a motor vehicle is not a "guest" within the
guest statute unless all the conditions set forth in the statute are
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satisfied. It is submitted that the guest statutes should be construed
so as to include such incidents of transportation as boarding and
alighting from the vehicle.
Lowell B. Howard
TORTS--RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Following publication by the Curtis Publishing Co. of a satiri-
cal article concerning taxicab drivers of Washington, D. C., plain-
tiff taxicab driver brought an action against the publishing com-
pany for libel and for invasion of the right of privacy. The com-
plaint was based on the article and its accompanying illustration,
a photograph of a taxicab and of the plaintiff. The defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint on grounds of insufficiency. Held, motion
denied inasmuch as the plaintiff had presented a cause of action.
Peay v. Curts Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (Dist. D.C. 1948)
The concept of the right of privacy as a legal right independent
of any other was first propounded by Messrs. Brandeis and Warren
who categorized it as a natural right. PROSSER, TORTS 1051. It has
been defined as the right to be let alone, to be free from interfer-
ence with one's private affairs and peace of mind. Warren and
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890) ; Jones
v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W 2d 972 (1929). In its
growth, this recent tort has acquired some characteristics of the
defamation group. Consent results in forfeiture of the right.
Marek v. Zanol Products Co., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N.E. 2d 393 (1937).
The right is strictly a personal one. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28
F Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939). Such an action cannot be brought
by persons whose activities are of interest to the general public.
Elm hurst v. Pearson, 153 F. 2d 467 (App. D.C. 1946) ; Jones v.
Herald Post Co., supra. In its application, this rule is analagous
to the principle of fair comment, an attempt by the courts to bal-
ance the public interest in freedom of speech and of the press with
the interests of the individual. The action is, however, dissimilar
to those of defamation in other respects. Truth is not a defense.
Themo v. New England Newspaper Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E. 2d
753 (1940). Publication is unnecessary. Rhodes v. Graham, 238
Ky. 225, 37 S.W. 2d 46 (1931). Malice is not a requisite, the mo-
tives of the invader being unimportant. Sidis v. F-R Publishng
Co., 113 F. 2d 806 (C.C.A. 2d 1940). Actual damages need not be
shown. K'uz v. Allen, 102 Kans. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
In Pavesich v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190
(1905), the leading case on this subject, and also in Peed v. Wash-
ington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (1927), relied upon in the
opinion of the principal case, an unauthorized publication of a pho-
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tograph was sufficient to allow recovery. It would seem, therefore,
that the court correctly overruled the motion to dismiss.
In Ohio, the lower courts have on two occasions struggled with
this new tort. In the first instance the court found it unnecessary
to declare its position with respect to the existence of such a legal
right, stating, apparently erroneously, that if there were such a
right, there had been no intrusion. Martin v. F. I. Y. Theatre Co.,
26 Ohio L. Abs. 67, 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P., 1938) ; Comment, 4 OHIo
ST. L. J. 396 (1938). In the second case considered, the court
expressly recognized the right as a natural one. Fredman v. Hotel
and Restaurant Employees Alliance, 20 Ohio Op. 473, 6 Ohio Supp.
276 (C.P. 1941). It then granted a cause of action to a third party
not the subject of the interference. As previously mentioned, this is
contrary to the established rule that the right is purely personal.
Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., supra.
The rapid growth of this doctrine and the advent of television
as a possible accelerating factor seem to indicate that the Supreme
Court of Ohio may shortly have to accept or reject the position
taken by the lower court. Ohio, Michigan, and Oregon, following
the common law principle, do not permit recovery for injury to the
sensibilities alone, unless wilful. Davis v Cleveland Ry. Co., 135
Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E. 2d (1939) ; Wolfe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E. 2d 230 (1944); Atkinson v.
Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899) ; Rostad v. Portland
Light & Power Co., 101 Ore. 569, 201 Pac. 184 (1921). The basic
concept of the right to privacy is that of freedom from mental dis-
tress and annoyance. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
supra. The Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that the right was
itself a legal one and that injury to the feelings was a concomitant;
consequently, they allowed recovery. Hinish v. Meir & Frank Co.,
166 Ore. 482, 113 P 2d 438 (1941). Conversely, the Supreme Court
of Michigan reasoned that the recognition of this right would be
tantamount to allowing recovery for injury solely to the sensibili-
ties, therefore they denied recovery. Atkinson v. Doherty, supra.
Washington, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island have followed this Mich-
igan decision. Hellman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117
Pac. 594 (1911) ; Judevne v. Benzies-Montanye Co., 222 Wis. 512,
269 N.W. 295 (1936) ; Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atl.
97 (1909).
The majority of the jurisdictions considering the question have
recognized the right, generally holding as did Oregon. PRossER,
TORTS 1052. New York, although not considering such a right to
be inherent in the common law, has enacted a statute creating one
when the wrong-doer is motivated by prospect of financial benefits
through advertising or trade. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America,
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210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913). If it becomes necessary for it
to rule on the question, apparently the better course for the Ohio
Supreme Court to follow is that of the majority, inasmuch as the
minority decisions have resulted from a reluctance to circumvent
a common-law rule which has long been attacked as unreasonable
and unjust.
J. Robert Donnelly
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-AVAILABILITY FOR WORK
Claimant was employed by appellant company. His duties con-
sisted of sweeping up steel filings and carting them away in a
wheelbarrow. Upon the advice of his physician he quit the job, the
work being too heavy for him, in view of his physical condition,
and filed a claim for unemployment compensation. Claimant had
previously done watchman and checking work for another employer.
The Board of Review disallowed the claim, holding claimant was
not available for work. The Common Pleas Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Board as manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Common Pleas
Court but certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground
that it was in conflict with a case decided by the Fourth Appellate
District. Stevens v. The Selby Shoe Co., not reported (1945).
Held, affirmed. The claimant was available for work and entitled
to the benefits of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Hinde v.
Lennox Furnace Co., 150 Ohio St. 471 (1948).
The Court of Appeals, Second District, had previously held that
a claimant, in order to be deemed available for work, must be avail-
able for the work he had been doing at the termination of his em-
ployment. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board, 70 Ohio App. 370, 24
Ohio Ops. 228, 45 N.E. 2d 152 (1942), motion to certify overruled
Oct. 21, 1942. At that time, by statute, no employee was entitled
to benefits unless he was "... capable of and available for work."
OHIO GEN. CODE 1345-6 (a) (1). In 1941 the pertinent portion was
amended to read ".... is able to work and available for work in his
usual trade or occupation, or in any other trade or occupation for
which he is reasonably fitted." OHIO GEN. CODE 1345-6 (a) (4).
The Court of Appeals in the instant case held that the effect of the
amendment was to establish two alternative tests of availability:
(1) Available for work in his usual trade or occupation; or, (2)
Available for work in any other trade or occupation for which
claimant is reasonably fitted. The Supreme Court, impliedly adopt-
ing this view, held, in a per curiam opinion, that claimant, having
previously done watchman and checking work, qualified under the
second alternative.
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The general purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Stat-
utes is to alleviate the economic distresses resulting from involun-
tary unemployment. Baker v. Powhatan Ming Co., 146 Ohio St.
600, 67 N.E. 2d 714 (1946) ; W. T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review,
129 N.J.L. 402, 29 A. 2d 858 (1943). Evidencing the fact that it
was not designed as a health insurance is the availability require-
ment present in all the statutes. The test of availability is the
claimant's attachment to the labor market. Shorten v. Unemploy-
ment Compensatwn Commissoner, 10 Conn. Supp. 186 (1941);
Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898 (1946) ; In re Steinberg, 262 App.
Div. 921, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 197 (1942). Thus, those unable or unwill-
ing to perform any type of work are obviously ineligible to receive
benefits; as are those who limit their availability without good
cause. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353
Mo. 540, 183 S.W. 2d 77 (1944) ; D'Yantone v. Unemployment Com-
pensaton Bd., 159 Pa. Super. 45, 46 A. 2d 525 (1946). The problem
arises where the claimant restricts his availability with good cause,
Leonard v. Board, 148 Ohio St. 419, 36 Ohio Ops. 60, 75 N.E. 2d
567 (1947) ; Mills v. S. C. Unemployment Compensation Commis-
sion, 204 S.C. 37, 28 S.E. 2d 535 (1944), or where the restriction,
due to age or physical condition, is beyond his control, as in the
instant case. Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306,
18 N.W. 2d 249 (1945). See notes, 158 A.L.R. 404 (1945), 165
A.L.R. 1386 (1946).
The cases are in conflict as to when availability becomes so re-
stricted as to disqualify a claimant but ". . . the general principle
should be that an individual is able to work, despite his age and
physical condition, if there is a market in the geographical area in
which he is willing to work for services which he is able to per-
form." Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE
L. J. 123, 129 (1945). The claimant in the instant case qualified
under this standard and it would seem that the same result might
have been reached in earlier Ohio decisions even in the absence of
the amendment relied on by the court.
The opinion notes that the amendment requires reasonable fit-
ness and mentions the fact that the claimant had previously demon-
strated such fitness as a watchman and checker. In the Brockmeyer
case, supra, it was said that fitness refers to training and experi-
ence. However, if the work which claimant is able and willing to
perform requires little or no training, it would hardly seem logical
that a lack of experience in such an occupation should disqualify
him as not being "reasonably fitted."
The Court of Appeals in the Selby case, supra, admitted that the
claimant had quit her last employment with good cause, but held
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that since that employment was still available to her, she was dis-
qualified by OHIO GEN. CODE 1345-6 (a) (5) which requires that the
claimant be unable to obtain work in his usual trade or occupation
or any other trade or occupation for which he is reasonably fitted.
This was also the reasoning adopted in the Brockmeyer case, supra.
The failure of the Supreme Court to mention this restrictive inter-
pretation in the principal case may properly be interpreted to imply
future repudiation of a view which illogically required an applicant
to accept a position which he had previously been justified in leaving
on pain of loss of benefits.
William Machuga
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